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Income Tax Evasion and the Penalty Structure

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Author Info
Rainald Borck () (DIW Berlin)

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Abstract

In the Allingham-Sandmo (AS) model of tax evasion, fines are paid on evaded income, whereas in the Yitzhaki (Y) model fines are levied on evaded tax. This note compares the two models. In the Y model, evasion is higher and tax revenue lower than in the AS model. If government seeks to maximize expected tax revenue, it would prefer penalties of the AS type; if it maximizes expected voter welfare, it should choose Y type penalties. A voting model to determine the penalty structure is also considered.

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File URL: http://www.economicsbulletin.com/2004/volume8/EB-04H20010A.pdf
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Economics Bulletin in its journal Economics Bulletin.

Volume (Year): 8 (2004)
Issue (Month): 5 ()
Pages: 1-9
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:v:8:y:2004:i:5:p:1-9

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Related research
Keywords: penalty schedule tax evasion

Find related papers by JEL classification:
H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Rainald Borck, 2003. "Voting on Redistribution with Tax Evasion," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 329, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  2. Gans, Joshua S. & Smart, Michael, 1996. "Majority voting with single-crossing preferences," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 219-237, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. James Andreoni & Brian Erard & Jonathan Feinstein, 1998. "Tax Compliance," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(2), pages 818-860, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. repec:att:wimass:199610 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. Borck, Rainald, 2004. "Stricter enforcement may increase tax evasion," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 725-737, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Wolfram Richter & Robin Boadway, 2001. "Trading Off Tax Distortion and Tax Evasion," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2008-8-28.


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