This paper examines the determinants of recent antidumping decisions administered by the International Trade Commission and the Department of Commerce in the United States and the European Commission in Europe. We use case-specific data for the US and the EU, and political pressure data to investigate the macroeconomic and industry-level determinants of decision given by the antidumping authority. We estimate a Probit model to analyze the decisions of the authorities. Besides the economic factors, we find evidence of the existence of political influence as a motive for implementation antidumping measures.
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Article provided by Economics Bulletin in its journal Economics Bulletin.
Find related papers by JEL classification: F1 - International Economics - - Trade F1 - International Economics - - Trade
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Bruce A. Blonigen & Thomas J. Prusa, 2001.
"Antidumping,"
NBER Working Papers
8398, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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