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Rationalizability of one-to-one matchings with externalities

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Author Info
Ayþe Mumcu () (Bogazici University)
Ismail Saglam () (TOBB University of Economics and Technology)

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Abstract

In this paper, we show that the one-to-one matching model of Mumcu and Saglam (2008) studying stability under interdependent preferences is refutable. We also give a sufficient characterization of the set of matchings that are rationalizable inside the core.

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File URL: http://economicsbulletin.vanderbilt.edu/2008/volume4/EB-08D70031A.pdf
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Economics Bulletin in its journal Economics Bulletin.

Volume (Year): 4 (2008)
Issue (Month): 33 ()
Pages: 1-8
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Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2008:i:33:p:1-8

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Related research
Keywords: One-to-one matching; Stability; Externalities; Rationalizability;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Prabal Roy Chowdhury, 2004. "Marriage markets with externalities," Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers 04-11, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-16.

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