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Equal probability for the best and the assignment of identical indivisible objects

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Author Info
Wataru KUREISHI () (Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University)
Hideki MIZUKAMI () (Faculty of Economics, University of Toyama)
Abstract

We consider the problem of allocating several units of an indivisible object among agents with single-peaked utility functions. We introduce an axiom called equal probability for the best, and show that it is equivalent to both equal treatment of equals and symmetry in the presence of Pareto optimality. Moreover, we also show that the randomized uniform rule is the only randomized rule satisfying strategy-proofness, Pareto optimality, and equal probability for the best.

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File URL: http://economicsbulletin.vanderbilt.edu/2007/volume4/EB-06D60003A.pdf
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Economics Bulletin in its journal Economics Bulletin.

Volume (Year): 4 (2007)
Issue (Month): 8 ()
Pages: 1-10
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2007:i:8:p:1-10

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Postal: Economics Bulletin, Department of Economics, 414 Calhoun Hall, Vanderbilt University, Nashville TN 37235, USA
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Related research
Keywords: Equal Probability for the Best; Indivisibility; Single-Peaked Utility Functions; The Randomized Uniform Rule;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. EHLERS, Lars & KLAUS, Bettina, 2001. "Probabilistic Assignments of Identical Indivisible Objects and Uniform Probabilistic Rules," Cahiers de recherche 2001-27, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Sprumont, Yves, 1991. "The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 509-19, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Kentaro Hatsumi & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2009. "Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 423-447, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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