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Continuing Conflict and Stalemate: A note

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Author Info
Raul Caruso () (Institute of Economic Policy, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore)

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Abstract

This note is about the possibility of a stalemate in a continuing conflict. Following the prevailing economic literature on the topic, under some assumptions, the outcome of a conflict can be described in two ways: (i) a predetermined split of the contested output; (ii) a winner-take-all contest where the winning agent is capable to grab all the contested stake. By contrast, in reality many disputes do not have a clear or a definite outcome. A stalemate can end the conflict with the result of a draw. To allow for a stalemate some formal modifications to the classical Hirshleifer’s model of conflict are needed. In particular, since the cornerstone of the economic literature on conflict is the Contest Success Function the possibility of a stalemate can be captured through a modified form of the CSF as axiomatized by Blavatskyy (2004). When a stalemate can emerge, results show that the scenario exhibits a higher degree of violence.

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File URL: http://economicsbulletin.vanderbilt.edu/2007/volume4/EB-07D70005A.pdf
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Economics Bulletin in its journal Economics Bulletin.

Volume (Year): 4 (2007)
Issue (Month): 17 ()
Pages: 1-8
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2007:i:17:p:1-8

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Postal: Economics Bulletin, Department of Economics, 414 Calhoun Hall, Vanderbilt University, Nashville TN 37235, USA
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Related research
Keywords: Conflict; Contest Success Function; Entropy; Hirshleifer; Stalemate; Violence.;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
H5 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Raul Caruso, 2004. "A Trade Institution as a Peaceful Institution?," Others 0406003, EconWPA, revised 15 Dec 2004. [Downloadable!]
  2. Grossman, Herschel I & Kim, Minseong, 1995. "Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1275-88, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Garfinkel, Michelle R. & Skaperdas, Stergios, 2007. "Economics of Conflict: An Overview," Handbook of Defense Economics, Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. J. Amegashie, 2006. "A contest success function with a tractable noise parameter," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 126(1), pages 135-144, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Caruso, Raul, 2007. "Reciprocity in the shadow of Threat," MPRA Paper 1788, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  6. Anderton, Charles H & Anderton, Roxane A & Carter, John R, 1999. "Economic Activity in the Shadow of Conflict," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 37(1), pages 166-79, January.
  7. Dixit, Avinash K, 1987. "Strategic Behavior in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 891-98, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Skaperdas, Stergios, 1996. "Contest Success Functions," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 283-90, February.
    Other versions:
  9. Neary, Hugh M, 1997. "Equilibrium Structure in an Economic Model of Conflict," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 35(3), pages 480-94, July.
  10. Skaperdas, Stergios, 1992. "Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 720-39, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  11. Caruso, Raul, 2007. "Conflict and Conflict Managment with Asymmetric Stakes (The Bad-Cop and the Good Cop part II)," MPRA Paper 1438, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  12. Grossman, Herschel I, 1991. "A General Equilibrium Model of Insurrections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(4), pages 912-21, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Caruso, Raul, 2007. "A Tentative Model of Conflict, Appropriation and Production in a two-sector Economy," MPRA Paper 4053, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-16.

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