This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

When Inertia Generates Political Cycles

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Raphaël Soubeyran () (GREQAM, University of the Mediterranean)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

In this note, we propose a simple infinite horizon of elections with two candidates. We suppose that the government policy presents some degree of inertia, i.e. a new government cannot completely change the policy implemented by the incumbent. When the policy inertia is strong enough, no party can win the elections a consecutive infinite number of times.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://economicsbulletin.vanderbilt.edu/2006/volume4/EB-06D70008A.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Article provided by Economics Bulletin in its journal Economics Bulletin.

Volume (Year): 4 (2006)
Issue (Month): 31 ()
Pages: 1-8
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2006:i:31:p:1-8

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Economics Bulletin, Department of Economics, 414 Calhoun Hall, Vanderbilt University, Nashville TN 37235, USA
Phone: 615-322-2920
Fax: 615-343-8495
Email:
Web page: http://www.economicsbulletin.com

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (John Conley).

Related research
Keywords: Policy inertia; Political cycles;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Casamatta, Georges & De Donder, Philippe, 2003. "On the Influence of Extreme Parties in Electoral Competition with Policy-Motivated Candidates," CEPR Discussion Papers 3885, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Enriqueta Aragones, 1994. "Negativity Effect and the Emergence of Ideologies," Discussion Papers 1125, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Heckelman, Jac C., 2000. "Sequential elections and overlapping terms: voting for US Senate," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 97-108, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Nicolas Houy, 2007. "When inertia generates political cycles: a remark," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 4(16), pages 1-5. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Data contributors to RePEc receive monthly emails with details about downloads and abstract views of their works.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-12.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.