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Extending Xu's results to Arrow's Impossibility Theorem

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Author Info
Herrade Igersheim () (CODE, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)

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Abstract

This note shows that results similar to Arrow's Impossibility Theorem can be proved by replacing the weak Pareto principle by a weaker condition called Pareto Neutrality and used by Xu (1990) to state another version of Sen's liberal paradox. Our result strengthens Xu's arguments for taking into account non-welfarist information into the social-choice-theoretic framework.

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File URL: http://economicsbulletin.vanderbilt.edu/2005/volume4/EB-05D70027A.pdf
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Economics Bulletin in its journal Economics Bulletin.

Volume (Year): 4 (2005)
Issue (Month): 13 ()
Pages: 1-6
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2005:i:13:p:1-6

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Postal: Economics Bulletin, Department of Economics, 414 Calhoun Hall, Vanderbilt University, Nashville TN 37235, USA
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Related research
Keywords: Arrow's Impossibility Theorem; collective choice; weak Pareto principle;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Wilson, Robert, 1972. "Social choice theory without the Pareto Principle," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 478-486, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Sen, Amartya, 1970. "The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(1), pages 152-57, Jan.-Feb.. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Mas-Colell, Andreu & Sonnenschein, Hugo, 1972. "General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 39(2), pages 185-92, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Donald G. Saari, 1998. "Connecting and resolving Sen's and Arrow's theorems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 239-261. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-12.

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