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Costly participation in voting and equilibrium abstention: a uniqueness result

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Author Info
Takanori Adachi () (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania)

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Abstract

This note shows that a unique mixed Nash equilibrium obtains when there are three voters in Palfrey and Rosenthal's (1983) costly voting game under complete information. Experimental investigation of this result might be interesting.

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File URL: http://www.economicsbulletin.com/2004/volume4/EB-03D70012A.pdf
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Economics Bulletin in its journal Economics Bulletin.

Volume (Year): 4 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 1-5
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2004:i:2:p:1-5

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Related research
Keywords: Abstention; Costly Participation; Mixed Strategies;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Martin Osborne & Jeffry Rosenthal & Matthew A. Turner, 1998. "Meetings with costly participation," Working Papers mturner-98-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Matthew Turner & Quinn Weninger, 2005. "Meetings with Costly Participation: An Empirical Analysis," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 72(1), pages 247-268, 01. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Timothy J. Fedderson & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1996. "Abstention in Elections with Asymmetric Information and Diverse Preferences," Discussion Papers 1195, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  4. Stephen Coate & Michael Conlin, 2002. "Voter Turnout: Theory and Evidence from Texas Liquor Referenda," NBER Working Papers 8720, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Feddersen, Timothy J & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 1996. "The Swing Voter's Curse," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 408-24, June.
    Other versions:
    • Timothy J. Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1995. "The Swing Voter's Curse," Discussion Papers 1064, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  6. Tilman Borgers, 2004. "Costly Voting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(1), pages 57-66, March. [Downloadable!]
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Statistics
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-16.


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