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On the Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Coalition Formation Rules

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Author Info
Carmelo Rodriguez-Alvarez () (W.A. Wallis Institute of Political Economy. University of Rochester)

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Abstract

We analyze simple coalition formation problems in which a group of agents is partitioned into coalitions and agents' preferences only depend on the identity of the members of the coalition to which they belong. We study coaltion formation rules that associate to each profile of agents' preferences a partition of the group of agents. Assuming that agents' preferences are separable, we show that no coalition formation rule can satisfy the joint requirements of strategy-proofness, individual rationality, non-bossiness, and voters' sovereignty.

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File URL: http://www.economicsbulletin.com/2004/volume4/EB-04D70004A.pdf
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Economics Bulletin in its journal Economics Bulletin.

Volume (Year): 4 (2004)
Issue (Month): 10 ()
Pages: 1-8
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2004:i:10:p:1-8

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Related research
Keywords: Coalition Formation Rule; Individual Rationality; Non-Bossiness; Strategy-Proofness; Voters' Sovereignty.;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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  1. Koji Takamiya, 2003. "On strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores: A converse result," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 77-83. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Suryapratim Banerjee & Hideo Konishi & Tayfun Sonmez, 1999. "Core in a Simple Coalition Formation Game," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 449, Boston College Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Dreze, J H & Greenberg, J, 1980. "Hedonic Coalitions: Optimality and Stability," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(4), pages 987-1003, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Barbera, Salvador & Sonnenschein, Hugo & Zhou, Lin, 1991. "Voting by Committees," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 595-609, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Antonio Romero-Medina & Katari´na Cechlárová, 2001. "Stability in coalition formation games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 29(4), pages 487-494. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Tayfun Sonmez, 1999. "Strategy-Proofness and Essentially Single-Valued Cores," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(3), pages 677-690, May.
  8. Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. José Alcalde & Pablo Revilla, 2003. "Researching with Whom? Stability and Manipulation," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2003/35, Centro de Estudios Andaluces. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Jackson, Matthew O., 2002. "The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 201-230, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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