This paper investigates the quality implications of an upper limit on product prices in a vertically differentiated duopoly. It is shown that a price ceiling diminishes the incentives for strategic product differentiation, thereby improving average quality in the market.
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Article provided by Economics Bulletin in its journal Economics Bulletin.
Find related papers by JEL classification: D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
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