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From social choice functions to dictatorial social welfare functions

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  • Antonio Quesada

    () (Universidad de Murcia)

Abstract

A procedure to construct a social welfare function from a social choice function is suggested and it is shown that the dictatorial are the only unanimous social welfare functions that can be reconstructed from a social choice function that does not change the social choice when a defeated alternative is moved to the last position in all the individual preferences.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by AccessEcon in its journal Economics Bulletin.

Volume (Year): 4 (2002)
Issue (Month): 16 ()
Pages: 1-7
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Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2002:i:16:p:1-7

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  1. Eric Maskin, 1998. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1829, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  2. Muller, Eitan & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1977. "The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 412-418, April.
  3. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
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