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From social choice functions to dictatorial social welfare functions

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Author Info
Antonio Quesada () (Universidad de Murcia)

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Abstract

A procedure to construct a social welfare function from a social choice function is suggested and it is shown that the dictatorial are the only unanimous social welfare functions that can be reconstructed from a social choice function that does not change the social choice when a defeated alternative is moved to the last position in all the individual preferences.

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File URL: http://www.economicsbulletin.com/2002/volume4/EB-02D70006A.pdf
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Economics Bulletin in its journal Economics Bulletin.

Volume (Year): 4 (2002)
Issue (Month): 16 ()
Pages: 1-7
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2002:i:16:p:1-7

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Postal: Economics Bulletin, Department of Economics, 414 Calhoun Hall, Vanderbilt University, Nashville TN 37235, USA
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Related research
Keywords: Arrow’s theorem dictator Maskin monotonocity social choice function social welfare function weak Pareto principle.

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Muller, Eitan & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1977. "The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 412-418, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Lars Ehlers & John A. Weymark, 2003. "Candidate stability and nonbinary social choice," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 233-243, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Maskin, Eric, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Donald G. Saari, 1998. "Connecting and resolving Sen's and Arrow's theorems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 239-261. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2008-6-16.

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