This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Preference Structure and Random Paths to Stability in Matching Markets

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
James Boudreau () (University of Connecticut)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This paper examines how preference correlation and intercorrelation combine to influence the length of a decentralized matching market's path to stability. In simulated experiments, marriage markets with various preference specifications begin at an arbitrary matching of couples and proceed toward stability via the random mechanism proposed by Roth and Vande Vate (1990). The results of these experiments reveal that fundamental preference characteristics are critical in predicting how long the market will take to reach a stable matching. In particular, intercorrelation and correlation are shown to have an exponential impact on the number of blocking pairs that must be randomly satisfied before stability is attained. The magnitude of the impact is dramatically different, however, depending on whether preferences are positively or negatively intercorrelated.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://economicsbulletin.vanderbilt.edu/2008/volume3/EB-08C70058A.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Article provided by Economics Bulletin in its journal Economics Bulletin.

Volume (Year): 3 (2008)
Issue (Month): 67 ()
Pages: 1-12
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2008:i:67:p:1-12

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Economics Bulletin, Department of Economics, 414 Calhoun Hall, Vanderbilt University, Nashville TN 37235, USA
Phone: 615-322-2920
Fax: 615-343-8495
Email:
Web page: http://www.economicsbulletin.com

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (John Conley).

Related research
Keywords: Marriage matching; stability; random paths.;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods and Programming

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Roth, Alvin E & Vande Vate, John H, 1990. "Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1475-80, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth, 2005. "The New York City High School Match," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 364-367, May. [Downloadable!]
  3. Alvin E. Roth, 2007. "Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions," NBER Working Papers 13225, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Eeckhout, Jan, 1999. "Bilateral Search and Vertical Heterogeneity," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 40(4), pages 869-87, November.
  5. James W. Boudreau & Vicki Knoblauch, 2008. "Marriage Matching and Intercorrelation of Preferences," Working papers 2008-27, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Roth, Alvin E. & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1992. "Two-sided matching," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 16, pages 485-541 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn, 2004. "Paths to Stability for Matching Markets with Couples," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 604.04, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), revised 01 Dec 2005. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Alvin E. Roth & Elliott Peranson, 1999. "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design," NBER Working Papers 6963, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Onur B. Celik & Vicki Knoblauch, 2007. "Marriage Matching with Correlated Preferences," Working papers 2007-16, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  10. Fuhito Kojima & M. Ünver, 2008. "Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 473-488, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  11. Vicki Knoblauch, 2009. "Marriage matching and gender satisfaction," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 15-27, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS was launched in September 1997.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-16.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.