The paper develops a simple theoretical framework for analyzing repeated contests. At each stage of the infinitely repeated game, a Tullock contest is played by two players. We consider local stability of the Nash equilibrium with respect to adjustment speed and the level of the prize. The model is extended to an asymmetric valuation of the prize and to the case with an endogenous prize, where the level of the prize is influenced by the investments of the players.
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Article provided by Economics Bulletin in its journal Economics Bulletin.
Volume (Year): 3 (2008) Issue (Month): 4 () Pages: 1-9 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML,
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Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2008:i:4:p:1-9
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
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