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Drift and equilibrium selection with human and computer players

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Author Info
Mauro Caminati () (University of Siena)
Alessandro Innocenti () (University of Siena)
Roberto Ricciuti () (University of Florence)

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Abstract

The theory of drift (Binmore and Samuelson 1999) concerns equilibrium selection in which second-order disturbances may have first-order effects in the emergence of one equilibrium over the other. We provided experimental evidence with human players supporting the model in Caminati, Innocenti and Ricciuti (2006). In this paper we test it with conditioning by computer players. When computers are removed and humans are matched against each other, the comparative static properties of the model are confirmed.

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File URL: http://economicsbulletin.vanderbilt.edu/2008/volume3/EB-08C70009A.pdf
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Economics Bulletin in its journal Economics Bulletin.

Volume (Year): 3 (2008)
Issue (Month): 19 ()
Pages: 1-7
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Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2008:i:19:p:1-7

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Related research
Keywords: drift; equilibrium selection; evolutionary games; experiments;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Ellison, Glenn, 1993. "Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1047-71, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Binmore, Ken & Samuelson, Larry, 1999. "Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(2), pages 363-93, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Caminati, Mauro & Innocenti, Alessandro & Ricciuti, Roberto, 2006. "Drift effect under timing without observability: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 393-414, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. repec:att:wimass:199529 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. Binmore, Ken, et al, 1993. "Focal Points and Bargaining," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 22(4), pages 381-409.
  8. Roth, Alvin E & Schoumaker, Francoise, 1983. "Expectations and Reputations in Bargaining: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(3), pages 362-72, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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