This paper studies the problem of the long-run preferences distribution in a large population using an evolutionary approach. Special attention is given to the investigation of the property of the mixed population equilibria, in which materialists and reciprocators coexist. Some of the players with reciprocal preference care about not only their own material payoffs but also about those of others, while the remaining ones are materialists who maximize their own material payoffs.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics