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Are there timing effects in coordination game experiments?

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Author Info
Tao Li () (Shanghai University of Finance and Economics)
Abstract

The timing effects (timing without observability) identified by Weber, Camerer, and Knez (2004) in coordination game experiments are caused by their fixed-matching protocol. When we use a random-matching protocol the alleged timing effects completely vanish.

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File URL: http://economicsbulletin.vanderbilt.edu/2007/volume3/EB-07C90001A.pdf
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Economics Bulletin in its journal Economics Bulletin.

Volume (Year): 3 (2007)
Issue (Month): 13 ()
Pages: 1-9
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2007:i:13:p:1-9

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Related research
Keywords: Coordination; Experiments; Observability; Timing;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Cooper, Russell & Douglas V. DeJong & Robert Forsythe & Thomas W. Ross, 1993. "Forward Induction in the Battle-of-the-Sexes Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1303-16, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Camerer, Colin F. & Knez, Marc & Weber, Roberto A., 1996. "Timing and Virtual Observability in Ultimatum Bargaining and Weak Link Coordination Games," Working Papers 970, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  3. R. Muller & Asha Sadanand, 2003. "Order of Play, Forward Induction, and Presentation Effects in Two-Person Games," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 5-25, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Amershi, A.H. & Sadanand, A.B. & Sadanand, V., 1989. "Manipulated Nash Equilibria - Iii: Applications And A Preliminary Experiment," Working Papers 1989-6, University of Guelph, Department of Economics.
  5. Amershi Amin H. & Sadanand Asha & Sadanand Venkatraman, 1992. "Player importance and forward induction," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 291-297, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Poulsen, Anders U. & Tan, Jonathan H.W., 2004. "Can Information Backfire? - Experimental Evidence from the Ultimatum Game," Working Papers 04-16, University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-12.

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