We report experimental results on a prisoners' dilemma implemented in a way which allows us to elicit incentive-compatible valuations of the game. We test the hypothesis that players' valuations coincide with their Nash equilibrium earnings. Our results offer significantly less support for this hypothesis than for the prediction of Dominant Strategy (DS) play.
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Article provided by Economics Bulletin in its journal Economics Bulletin.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982.
"Sequential Equilibria,"
Econometrica,
Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-94, July.
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