Tomohiko Kawamori () (Graduate School of Economics, University of Tokyo)
Abstract
This paper investigates a generalized Baron-Ferejohn model with different discount factors, different recognition probabilities and q-majority rule. In the paper, it is shown that if players are sufficiently patient, recognition probabilities are similar and the voting rule is not unanimous, each player's equilibrium payoff is inversely proportional to the ratio of the player's discount factor to the harmonic mean of all players' discount factors. This result implies the followings: (i) A less patient player obtains a greater payoff; (ii) As a player slightly becomes more patient, her payoff becomes smaller; (iii) The equilibrium payoffs do not depend on recognition probabilities; and (iv) They do not also depend on q.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Article provided by Economics Bulletin in its journal Economics Bulletin.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)