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On cooperation structures resulting from simultaneous proposals

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Author Info
Rod Garratt () (University of California, Santa Barbara)
Cheng-Zhong Qin () (University of California, Santa Barbara)

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Abstract

This paper looks at cooperation structures that result from a strategic game where players make simultaneous proposals for cooperation. We identify cooperation structures that maximize the potential of the game, and show how the outcome of potential maximization depends on the players' Shapley values. We do not assume superadditivity and hence, potential-maximizing strategy profiles do not always involve full cooperation. In cases where full cooperation does result from potential maximization it can be inefficient. An example provides intuition.

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File URL: http://www.economicsbulletin.com/2003/volume3/EB-03C70003A.pdf
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Economics Bulletin in its journal Economics Bulletin.

Volume (Year): 3 (2003)
Issue (Month): 5 ()
Pages: 1-9
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2003:i:5:p:1-9

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Related research
Keywords: cooperation formation game; cooperation structure; Myerson value; potential maximization; Shapley value.;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Rod Garratt & Cheng-Zhong Qin & James E. Parco & Amnon Rapoport, 2004. "Potential Maximization and Coalition Government Formation," Working Papers 2004.82, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Slikker, Marco & Dutta, Bhaskar & van den Nouweland, Anne & Tijs, Stef, 2000. "Potential maximizers and network formation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 55-70, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Rod Garratt & Cheng-Zhong Qin, 2003. "On potential maximization as a refinement of Nash equilibrium," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 3(12), pages 1-11. [Downloadable!]
  4. Stef Tijs & Anne van den Nouweland & Bhaskar Dutta, 1998. "Link formation in cooperative situations," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 245-256. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Qin, Cheng-Zhong, 1996. "Endogenous Formation of Cooperation Structures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 218-226, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1996. "Potential Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 124-143, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Jackson, Matthew O. & Wolinsky, Asher, 1996. "A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 44-74, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Gilles, R.P. & Sarangi, S., 2003. "The role of trust in costly network formation," Discussion Paper 53, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Sudipta Sarangi & Robert P. Gilles, . "The Role of Beliefs and Confidence in Building Social Networks," Departmental Working Papers 2005-15, Department of Economics, Louisiana State University. [Downloadable!]
  3. Gilles, R.P. & Sarangi, S., 2004. "Social network formation with consent," Discussion Paper 70, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  4. Robert P. Gilles & Sudipta Sarangi, 2006. "Building Social Networks," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 642, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  5. Anne van den Nouweland, 2004. "The Formation of Communication Networks in Cooperative Games," University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers 2004-2, University of Oregon Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
  6. Rod Garratt & Cheng-Zhong Qin & James E. Parco & Amnon Rapoport, 2004. "Potential Maximization and Coalition Government Formation," Working Papers 2004.82, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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