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Negative results in the theory of games with lexicographic utilities

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Author Info
Antonio Quesada () (Universitat de València (Spain))

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Abstract

When players may have lexicographic utilities, there are: (i) extensive games having a non-empty set of equilibria but empty sets of sequentially rational, sequential and perfect equilibria; (ii) normal form games having a non-empty set of equilibria but an empty set of proper equilibria and no stable set of equilibria; and (iii) two extensive games having the same normal form representation and disjoint sets of sequential equilibria.

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File URL: http://www.economicsbulletin.com/2003/volume3/EB-03C70011A.pdf
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Economics Bulletin in its journal Economics Bulletin.

Volume (Year): 3 (2003)
Issue (Month): 20 ()
Pages: 1-7
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Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2003:i:20:p:1-7

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Related research
Keywords: lexicographic expected utility; Nash equilibrium; Non-cooperative game; perfect equilibrium; proper equilibrium; sequential equilibrium; stable sets of equilibria.;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Peter J. Hammond, 1997. "Non-Archimedean Subjective Probabilities in Decision Theory and Games," Working Papers 97038, Stanford University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Rajan, Uday, 1998. "Trembles in the Bayesian Foundations of Solution Concepts of Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 248-266, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1003-37, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Blume, Lawrence & Brandenburger, Adam & Dekel, Eddie, 1991. "Lexicographic Probabilities and Equilibrium Refinements," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(1), pages 81-98, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-94, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-12.

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