Frederick Chen () (Department of Economics, Wake Forest University)
Abstract
Equilibrium sorting in a finite-horizon, two-sided matching market with heterogeneous agents is considered. It is shown that, if the match production function is additively separable in agent-types and if the division of match output is determined by the Nash bargaining solution, then an unraveling of the market obtains as the unique equilibrium in which all matches are formed in the first period.
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Article provided by Economics Bulletin in its journal Economics Bulletin.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Gary S. Becker, 1974.
"A Theory of Marriage: Part II,"
NBER Chapters,
in: Marriage, Family, Human Capital, and Fertility, pages 11-26
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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