In a game where firms select locations,technological interactions through the exchange of intermediate goods bring about a multiplicity of locational equilibria and entail a pattern of agglomeration of the productive activity with the variation of the transport costs that is opposite to the one usually proposed in the literature, namely in VENABLES (1996). VENABLES, Anthony (1996), "Equilibrium locations of vertically linked industries", International Economic Review, 37 (2): 341-359.
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