This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Can A Turing Player Identify Itself?

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
David Levine () (UCLA)
Balázs Szentes () (University of Chicago)
Abstract

We show that the problem of whether two Turing Machines are functionally equivalent is undecidable and explain why this is significant for the theory of repeated play and evolution.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://economicsbulletin.vanderbilt.edu/2006/volume1/EB-06A00001A.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Article provided by Economics Bulletin in its journal Economics Bulletin.

Volume (Year): 1 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 1-6
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:v:1:y:2006:i:1:p:1-6

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Economics Bulletin, Department of Economics, 414 Calhoun Hall, Vanderbilt University, Nashville TN 37235, USA
Phone: 615-322-2920
Fax: 615-343-8495
Email:
Web page: http://www.economicsbulletin.com

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (John Conley).

Related research
Keywords: Economic Theory Game Theory

Find related papers by JEL classification:
A0 - General Economics and Teaching - - General
A1 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. John H. Nachbar, 1997. "Prediction, Optimization, and Learning in Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(2), pages 275-310, March.
  2. Theodore C. Bergstrom, 2002. "Evolution of Social Behavior: Individual and Group Selection," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(2), pages 67-88, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Robson, A.J., 1989. "Efficiency In Evolutionary Games: Darwin, Nash And Secret Handshake," Papers 89-22, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
  4. Canning, David, 1992. "Rationality, Computability, and Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(4), pages 877-88, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1986. "Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 83-96, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? There are over 15000 authors registered on RePEc Author Service.

This page was last updated on 2008-6-16.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.