We study the impacts of bankruptcy risk on markets for tradable environmental and natural resource permits. We show that bankruptcy risk in a competitive market for tradable permits causes an inefficient distribution of these permits among firms. Moreover, the equilibrium distribution of permits is dependent of the initial distribution of permits. Thus, the main reasons for implementing markets for environmental and natural resource rights do not hold when some firms are financially insecure.
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Article provided by Economics Bulletin in its journal Economics Bulletin.
Find related papers by JEL classification: Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation
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