Strategic patents and asymmetric litigation costs as entry deterrence instruments

This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data

Strategic patents and asymmetric litigation costs as entry deterrence instruments

Author Info

Julio R. Robledo () (University of Vienna)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Julio R. Robledo

Abstract

To spur innovation, the patent protection system grants the patentee limited monopoly power to recoup his R&D investment, although, in general, allowing the use of the public good "innovation" is socially efficient. But patents and patent threats can also be used strategically, e.g. to deter entry from competitors. This note shows that, besides incumbency, the present patent protection system constitutes an additional strategic instrument that favors the incumbent, because asymmetric litigation costs may deter entry from potential rivals.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Economics Bulletin in its journal Economics Bulletin.

Volume (Year): 15 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 1-9
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:v:15:y:2005:i:2:p:1-9

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Economics Bulletin, Department of Economics, 414 Calhoun Hall, Vanderbilt University, Nashville TN 37235, USA
Phone: 615-322-2920
Fax: 615-343-8495
Email:
Web page: http://www.economicsbulletin.com

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (John Conley).

Find related papers by JEL classification:
O3 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change
L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Lanjouw, Jean O & Schankerman, Mark, 2001. "Characteristics of Patent Litigation: A Window on Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(1), pages 129-51, Spring.
Denicolo, Vincenzo, 1996. "Patent Races and Optimal Patent Breadth and Length," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 44(3), pages 249-65, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1983. "Uncertain Innovation and the Persistence of Monopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 741-48, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Reinganum, Jennifer R., 1982. "Uncertain Innovation and the Persistence of Monopoly," Working Papers 431, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
Yi, Sang-Seung, 1995. "Uncertain innovation and persistence of monopoly revisited," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 319-322, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Wright, Donald J., 1999. "Optimal patent breadth and length with costly imitation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 419-436, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- D. Wright, 1997. "Optimal Patent Breadth and Length with Costly Imitation," Working Papers 9707, University of Sydney, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Donald Wright, . "Optimal Patent Breadth and Length with Costly Imitation," Discussion Papers 95/7, Department of Economics, University of York.
Wesley M. Cohen & Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh, 2000. "Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not)," NBER Working Papers 7552, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Wesley M Cohen & Richard R Nelson & John P Walsh, 2003. "Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (Or Not)," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000624, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
Richard C. Levin & Alvin K. Klevorick & Richard R. Nelson & Sidney G. Winter, 1987. "Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 18(1987-3), pages 783-832. [Downloadable!]
Richard Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, 1990. "Optimal Patent Length and Breadth," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 106-112, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Richard Gilbert and Carl Shapiro., 1989. "Optimal Patent Length and Breadth," Economics Working Papers 89-102, University of California at Berkeley.
- Gilbert, R. & Shapiro, C., 1988. "Optimal Patent Length And Breadth," Papers 28, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper.
A. Michael Spence, 1977. "Entry, Capacity, Investment and Oligopolistic Pricing," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 8(2), pages 534-544, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Dixit, Avinash, 1980. "The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 90(357), pages 95-106, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Dixit, Avinash, 1979. "The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 140, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
Nordhaus, William D, 1969. "An Economic Theory of Technological Change," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(2), pages 18-28, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- William D. Nordhaus, 1969. "An Economic Theory of Technological Change," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 265, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
Richard C. Levin & Alvin K. Klevorick & Richard R. Nelson & Sidney G. Winter, 1988. "Appropriating the Returns from Industrial R&D," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 862, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
Klemperer, Paul, 1990. "How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?," CEPR Discussion Papers 392, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Paul Klemperer, 1990. "How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 113-130, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Nancy T. Gallini, 1992. "Patent Policy and Costly Imitation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(1), pages 52-63, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Nordhaus, William D, 1972. "The Optimum Life on a Patent: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(3), pages 428-31, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Gilbert, Richard J & Newbery, David M G, 1982. "Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(3), pages 514-26, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? There are over 21000 authors registered on RePEc Author Service.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-12.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.