Coupled with the early wave of privatization in the 80s of state-owned telecom enterprises, the reform trend in the telecom market has shifted toward the market liberalization since the 90s, resulting in extended multilateral negotiations on the introduction of competition into basic telecommunications. Building on the empirical model of Greene (1998), this study employs a recursive simultaneous bivariate probit model and examines how the ownership status of incumbent telecom operators affects the market liberalization in basic telecom services. The results show that the implementation of market liberalization programs is clustered where private ownership is more present while opportune stock market conditions and the government's capital constraints are positively associated with the privatization. This study provides the concerned governments with policy choices that can facilitate or retard the implementation of a market liberalization program in their respective countries.
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