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The Distributive Role of Managerial Incentives in a Mixed Duopoly

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Author Info
Bibhas Saha () (University of East Anglia)
Rudra Sensarma () (University of Hertfordshire)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We study a mixed oligopoly where a partially public firm competeswith a private firm. When the private firm offers managerialincentives, there is a redistribution of profit and output fromthe private to the public firm, but the aggregate output andsocial welfare may remain unchanged. When the private firm isforeign owned, the extent of privatization is less whilemanagerial incentives are milder.

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File URL: http://economicsbulletin.vanderbilt.edu/2008/volume12/EB-08L10033A.pdf
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Economics Bulletin in its journal Economics Bulletin.

Volume (Year): 12 (2008)
Issue (Month): 28 ()
Pages: 1-10
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:v:12:y:2008:i:28:p:1-10

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Postal: Economics Bulletin, Department of Economics, 414 Calhoun Hall, Vanderbilt University, Nashville TN 37235, USA
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Related research
Keywords: partial privatization; mixed duopoly; managerial incentives;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
L3 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Vickers, John, 1985. "Delegation and the Theory of the Firm," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(380a), pages 138-47, Supplemen. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Yasuhiko Nakamura & Tomohiro Inoue, 2007. "Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly: The Managerial Delegation Case," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 12(27), pages 1-7. [Downloadable!]
  3. Steven D. Sklivas, 1987. "The Strategic Choice of Managerial Incentives," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(3), pages 452-458, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. John S. Heywood & Guangliang Ye, 2009. "Delegation in a mixed oligopoly: the case of multiple private firms," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 30(2), pages 71-82. [Downloadable!]
  5. Matsumura, Toshihiro, 1998. "Partial privatization in mixed duopoly," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 473-483, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L, 1987. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 927-40, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. de Fraja, Giovanni & Delbono, Flavio, 1989. "Alternative Strategies of a Public Enterprise in Oligopoly," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 41(2), pages 302-11, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Kangsik, Choi, 2009. "Endogenous Timing with Government's Preference and Privatization," MPRA Paper 13844, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  2. Choi, Kangsik, 2009. "Government's Preference and Timing of Endogenous Wage Setting: Perspectives on Privatization and Mixed Duopoly," MPRA Paper 17221, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  3. Kangsik, Choi, 2009. "Privatization, Government's Preference and Unionization Structure: A Mixed Oligopoly Approach," MPRA Paper 13028, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-16.

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