Qiang Wang () (College of Economics and Management,Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics) Qi Chen () (College of Economics and Management,Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics)
Abstract
Equilibrium locations are analyzed in location-quantity games, in which firms acquire labor inputs through bilateral monopoly relations with independent labor union. We find that the pattern of locations varies as the transport rate increase in a linear city. In a circular city, firms locate equidistant form each other.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Anderson, Simon P & Neven, Damien J, 1991.
"Cournot Competition Yields Spatial Agglomeration,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 32(4), pages 793-808, November.
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