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Coopetition in a Mixed Duopoly Market

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Author Info
Duc De Ngo () (Université d’Orléans, LEO, CNRS, UMR 6221, France)
Mahito Okura () (Nagasaki University, Faculty of Economics)

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Abstract

This study aims to investigate the impact of privatization on the degree of cooperation and competition in a mixed duopoly market. In this market, one semipublic firm and one private firm determine the level of two types of effort: the cooperative effort made to enlarge the total market size and the competitive effort made to increase market share. In a contest framework, our results show that the competitive effort level of the semipublic firm is smaller than that of the private firm. The more the semipublic firm is concerned for social welfare, the less it competes. On the basis of average costs, we then identify the conditions in which only the semipublic firm undertakes cooperative effort while the private firm behaves as a free rider. Besides, contrarily to common belief, our results highlight that a bad level of privatization may favor the most the free rider. Furthermore, we find that the semipublic firm always expends more cooperative effort than does the private firm.

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File URL: http://economicsbulletin.vanderbilt.edu/2008/volume12/EB-07L10036A.pdf
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Economics Bulletin in its journal Economics Bulletin.

Volume (Year): 12 (2008)
Issue (Month): 21 ()
Pages: 1-9
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:v:12:y:2008:i:21:p:1-9

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Related research
Keywords: Contests; Coopetition; Free rider; Mixed oligopoly;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
L3 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Chung, Tai-Yeong, 1996. " Rent-Seeking Contest When the Prize Increases with Aggregate Efforts," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 87(1-2), pages 55-66, April.
  2. de Fraja, Giovanni & Delbono, Flavio, 1990. " Game Theoretic Models of Mixed Oligopoly," Journal of Economic Surveys, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 4(1), pages 1-17.
  3. Matsumura, Toshihiro, 1998. "Partial privatization in mixed duopoly," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 473-483, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Toshihiro Matsumura & Osamu Kanda, 2005. "Mixed Oligopoly at Free Entry Markets," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 84(1), pages 27-48, 02. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Kenneth Fjell & Debashis Pal, 1996. "A Mixed Oligopoly in the Presence of Foreign Private Firms," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 29(3), pages 737-43, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Pal, Debashis, 1998. "Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 181-185, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Richard G. Harris & Elmer G. Wiens, 1980. "Government Enterprise: An Instrument for the Internal Regulation of Industry," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 13(1), pages 125-32, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Mujumdar, Sudesh & Pal, Debashis, 1998. "Effects of indirect taxation in a mixed oligopoly," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 199-204, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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