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Mixed Motives of Simultaneous-move Games in a Mixed Duopoly: Comments and Erratum

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Author Info
Kangsik Choi () (Graduate school of international studies, Pusan National University)
Abstract

If the public and private firm have mixed motives about payoff in a simultaneous-move game, Choi (2006) analyzes that the resulting equilibrium turns out to be an inefficient level with the monopoly of private firm even if there are Nash equilibria. However, we find that if we use equilibrium profit, we would have solved its unique Nash equilibrium that both firms aim to maximize the relative payoffs.

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File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/EB/2007/Volume12/EB-07L00006A.pdf
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Article provided by AccessEcon in its journal Economics Bulletin.

Volume (Year): 12 (2007)
Issue (Month): 32 ()
Pages: 1-4
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:v:12:y:2007:i:32:p:1-4

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Related research
Keywords: Mixed Duopoly;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
L0 - Industrial Organization - - General
L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. de Fraja, Giovanni & Delbono, Flavio, 1990. " Game Theoretic Models of Mixed Oligopoly," Journal of Economic Surveys, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 4(1), pages 1-17.
  2. Kangsik Choi, 2006. "Mixed Motives of Simultaneous-move Games in a Mixed Duopoly," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 12(14), pages 1-7. [Downloadable!]
  3. Fernando Vega-Redondo, 1997. "The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(2), pages 375-384, March.
  4. de Fraja, Giovanni & Delbono, Flavio, 1989. "Alternative Strategies of a Public Enterprise in Oligopoly," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 41(2), pages 302-11, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2010-1-6.

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