In this paper we extend the analysis of the standard model of spatial discrimination with quantity competition along the linear city to the case in which the unit transportation cost is greater than one. We show that in such a case the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in locations is a dispersed symmetric equilibrium. Moreover, at this equilibrium firms' locations are not monotone in the transportation cost parameter.
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Article provided by Economics Bulletin in its journal Economics Bulletin.
Find related papers by JEL classification: L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance R3 - Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics - - Production Analysis and Firm Location
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Anderson, Simon P & Neven, Damien J, 1991.
"Cournot Competition Yields Spatial Agglomeration,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 32(4), pages 793-808, November.
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