Standard economic theory assumes individuals choose actions that optimize their expected utility. In this paper we investigate how the existence of players with non-standard preferences may influence economic agents' behavior in some of the most frequently studied non-cooperative games. We find that allowing for the existence of agents with relative preferences can help explain observed economic actions which, at times, appear counter-intuitive.
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Article provided by Economics Bulletin in its journal Economics Bulletin.
Find related papers by JEL classification: L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
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