Ming Hsin Lin () (Nagoya University) Hikaru Ogawa () (Nagoya University)
Abstract
This note studies the cost-reducing incentives in a mixed duopoly market. The result shows that while a profit-maximizing private firm carries out the cost-reducing investment, a social welfare-maximizing firm does not have an incentive to reduce its costs as long as the market share of the private firm is sufficiently large.
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Article provided by Economics Bulletin in its journal Economics Bulletin.
Volume (Year): 12 (2005) Issue (Month): 6 () Pages: 1-6 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML,
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Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:v:12:y:2005:i:6:p:1-6
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Find related papers by JEL classification: L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance L3 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise
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