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On the Licensing of Innovations under Strategic Delegation

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Author Info
Judy Hsu () (Nanhua University)
X. Henry Wang () (University of Missouri-Columbia)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This note uses a three-stage delegation-licensing-quantity game to study the licensing of a cost-reducing innovation by a patent-holding firm to its competitor. It is shown that licensing is less likely to occur under strategic delegation compared to no delegation.

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File URL: http://www.economicsbulletin.com/2004/volume12/EB-04L10002A.pdf
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Economics Bulletin in its journal Economics Bulletin.

Volume (Year): 12 (2004)
Issue (Month): 6 ()
Pages: 1-10
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:v:12:y:2004:i:6:p:1-10

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Postal: Economics Bulletin, Department of Economics, 414 Calhoun Hall, Vanderbilt University, Nashville TN 37235, USA
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Related research
Keywords: licensing strategic delegation

Find related papers by JEL classification:
L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Lin, Ping, 1996. "Fixed-Fee Licensing of Innovations and Collusion," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 44(4), pages 443-49, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, 1985. "On the Licensing of Innovations," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(4), pages 504-520, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Mukesh Eswaran, 1994. "Licensees as Entry Barriers," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 27(3), pages 673-88, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Shapiro, Carl, 1985. "Patent Licensing and R&D Rivalry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(2), pages 25-30, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Steven D. Sklivas, 1987. "The Strategic Choice of Managerial Incentives," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(3), pages 452-458, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L, 1987. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 927-40, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Gallini, Nancy T, 1984. "Deterrence by Market Sharing: A Strategic Incentive for Licensing," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(5), pages 931-41, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Ana I. Saracho, 2002. "Patent Licensing Under Strategic Delegation," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 11(2), pages 225-251, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2008-8-8.

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