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Collusion and the elasticity of demand

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Author Info
David Collie () (Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University)

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Abstract

The analysis of collusion in infinitely repeated Cournot oligopoly games has generally assumed that demand is linear, but this note uses constant-elasticity demand functions to investigate how the elasticity of demand affects the sustainability of collusion.

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File URL: http://www.economicsbulletin.com/2004/volume12/EB-04L10003A.pdf
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Economics Bulletin in its journal Economics Bulletin.

Volume (Year): 12 (2004)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 1-6
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:v:12:y:2004:i:3:p:1-6

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Postal: Economics Bulletin, Department of Economics, 414 Calhoun Hall, Vanderbilt University, Nashville TN 37235, USA
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Related research
Keywords: cartel; constant elasticity demand; Cournot oligopoly; supergame;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Andrea Gallice, 2008. "The Neglected Effects of Demand Characteristics on the Sustainability of Collusion," ICER Working Papers 03-2008, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Unal Zenginobuz & Haldun Evrenk, 2009. "Regulation Through a Revenue Contest," Working Papers 2009/01, Bogazici University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Aitor Ciarreta & Carlos Gutierrez-Hita, 2005. "Strategic Behavior and Collusion: An Application to the Spanish Electricity Market," DFAEII Working Papers 200502, University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-10-20.

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