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A Note on Cost-Reducing Alliances in Vertically Differentiated Oligopoly

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Author Info
Frédéric DEROÃAN () (FORUM)

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Abstract

In a vertically differentiated oligopoly, firms raise cost-reducing alliances before competing with each other. It is shown that heterogeneity in quality and in cost functions reduces individual incentives to form links. Furthermore, both differentiated Cournot and Bertrand competition qualitatively similar incitations to form alliances.

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File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/EB/2004/Volume12/EB-04L10044A.pdf
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Article provided by AccessEcon in its journal Economics Bulletin.

Volume (Year): 12 (2004)
Issue (Month): 11 ()
Pages: 1-6
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:v:12:y:2004:i:11:p:1-6

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior

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  1. John Sutton, 1997. "One Smart Agent," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(4), pages 605-628, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Symeonidis, George, 2003. "Quality heterogeneity and welfare," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 1-7, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Sang-Seung Yi, 1998. "Endogenous Formation of Joint Ventures with Efficiency Gains," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(3), pages 610-631, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Goyal, Sanjeev & Joshi, Sumit, 2003. "Networks of collaboration in oligopoly," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 57-85, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Francis Bloch, 1995. "Endogenous Structures of Association in Oligopolies," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(3), pages 537-556, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2010-1-6.

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