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• Junichiro Ishida

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Article provided by Economics Bulletin in its journal Economics Bulletin.

Volume (Year): 10 (2004)
Issue (Month): 8 ()
Pages: 1-8
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Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:v:10:y:2004:i:8:p:1-8

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Related research

Keywords: Information asymmetry Money burning Separating equilibrium Signaling Single-crossing property.

Find related papers by JEL classification:
J0 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - General
D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

1. Bagwell, Kyle & Ramey, Garey, 1994. "Advertising and Coordination," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 61(1), pages 153-72, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Kyle Bagwell & Garey Ramey, 1990. "Advertising and Coordination," Discussion Papers 903, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
   • Kyle Bagwell & Garey Ramey, 1992. "Advertising and Coordination," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 92-07, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
2. Nelson, Phillip, 1970. "Information and Consumer Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(2), pages 311-29, March-Apr. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Kihlstrom, Richard E & Riordan, Michael H, 1984. "Advertising as a Signal," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(3), pages 427-50, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Michael Waldman, 1984. "Job Assignments, Signalling, and Efficiency," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(2), pages 255-267, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Michael Waldman, 1983. "Job Assignments, Signalling nad Efficiency," UCLA Economics Working Papers 286, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
5. Bagwell, Kyle & Ramey, Garey, 1994. "Coordination Economies, Advertising, and Search Behavior in Retail Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 498-517, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Bagwell, K. & Ramey, G., 1992. "Coordination Economies, advertising and Search Behavior in Retail Markets," Papers e-92-1, Stanford - Hoover Institution.
   • Kyle Bagwell & Garey Ramey, 1992. "Coordination Economies, Advertising and Search Behavior in Retail Markets," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 92-05, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
6. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1986. "Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 796-821, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Paul R. Milgrom & John Roberts, 1984. "Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 709, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
7. John G. Riley, 2001. "Silver Signals: Twenty-Five Years of Screening and Signaling," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(2), pages 432-478, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Nelson, Philip, 1974. "Advertising as Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(4), pages 729-54, July/Aug.. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Daron Acemoglu & Jörn-Steffen Pischke, 1998. "Why Do Firms Train? Theory And Evidence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 113(1), pages 78-118, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Acemoglu, Daron & Pischke, Jörn-Steffen, 1996. "Why do Firms Train? Theory and Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 1460, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Acemoglu, D. & Pischki, J.S., 1996. "Why Do Firms Train? Theory and Evidence," Working papers 96-7, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
   • Daron Acemoglu & Jorn-Steffen Pischke, 1996. "Why Do Firms Train? Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 5605, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Spence, A Michael, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-74, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Ishida, Junichiro, 2004. "Signaling and strategically delayed promotion," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(6), pages 687-700, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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This page was last updated on 2008-8-28.