IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ebl/ecbull/eb-12-00896.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Acceptability prioritized preferences and equilibrium existence

Author

Listed:
  • Van Kolpin

    (University of Oregon)

Abstract

Economic agents may sometimes find themselves in circumstances in which they are effectively endowed with preferences that place a priority on first meeting specific "acceptability standards" before attention can be placed on optimizing their "aspirational objective." We introduce the notion of acceptability prioritized preferences to model such situations and show that not only are these preferences generally discontinuous, but they can also fail to be characterizable by utility functions of any kind. Despite this fact, we establish a pure strategy Nash equilibrium existence result for interactive environments whose populations include agents endowed with acceptability prioritized preferences.

Suggested Citation

  • Van Kolpin, 2013. "Acceptability prioritized preferences and equilibrium existence," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(1), pages 804-811.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-12-00896
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2013/Volume33/EB-13-V33-I1-P79.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Keywords

    discontinuous games; multi-objective games;

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-12-00896. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: John P. Conley (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.