A legislative bargaining approach to earmarked public expenditures
AbstractThis paper develops a model of legislative spending in which revenues can be spent through earmarks or a general fund. Legislative choice is modeled as a Baron and Ferejohn style legislative bargaining game. The novel approach is to model the bargaining process as a two-stage game reflecting the reality that earmarked expenditures precede general fund appropriations. This drives the result that all revenue is spent by way of earmarking leaving no revenue in the general fund.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by AccessEcon in its journal Economics Bulletin.
Volume (Year): 31 (2011)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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Earmarking; legislative bargaining; public goods.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
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