Relational contracts as a foundation for contractual incompleteness
AbstractContractual incompleteness is generally defined by a trade-off between costs and benefits. We examine this trade-off in a dynamic setting and show how the ability of the parties to sustain a relational contract leads to more incomplete contracts.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by AccessEcon in its journal Economics Bulletin.
Volume (Year): 31 (2011)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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Contractual incompleteness; Relational Contract; Reputation; Repeated Games;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
- D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
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