IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ebl/ecbull/eb-10-00695.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Lobbying-consistent Delegation and Sequential Policy Making

Author

Listed:
  • Marco Maria Sorge

    (BGSE, University of Bonn)

Abstract

This paper studies the relationship between interest group political influence and allocation of decisionmaking power in a potentially divided government. We consider a simple endogenous policy model in which a legislator is in charge of setting the levels of two different policy instruments - a tax rate and a revenue redistribution scheme - and may decide to delegate policy authority over the allocation task to a bureaucracy within a hierarchy. An organized group is able to influence the political process at both tiers through the provision of policy-contingent contributions. We find conditions under which legislative delegation and sequential decisionmaking are consistent in equilibrium with the presence of two-tier lobbying, as the effects of the former on the allocation of lobbying activities exactly counterbalance the loss from bureaucracy's capture. As a consequence, we find that the possibility of multi-tier lobbying within a divided government need not be harmful to the higher level policy maker in the political equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Marco Maria Sorge, 2010. "Lobbying-consistent Delegation and Sequential Policy Making," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 30(4), pages 3088-3102.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-10-00695
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2010/Volume30/EB-10-V30-I4-P285.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Nayara F. Macedo de Medeiros Albrecht, 2023. "Bureaucrats, interest groups and policymaking: a comprehensive overview from the turn of the century," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 10(1), pages 1-10, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Multi-tier lobbying; Multilevel governments; Delegation; Endogenous policy making;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-10-00695. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: John P. Conley (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.