On higher hurdles for incumbents
AbstractThe election mechanism has difficulties in selecting the most able candidates and deselecting less able ones. In a simple model we explore how the power of elections as a selection device can be improved by requiring higher vote thresholds than 50% for incumbents.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by AccessEcon in its journal Economics Bulletin.
Volume (Year): 30 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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Third JEL Category: H4;
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- Francesco Caselli & Thomas E. Cunningham & Massimo Morelli & Inés Moreno de Barreda, 2012.
"Signalling, Incumbency Advantage, and Optimal Reelection Thresholds,"
NBER Working Papers
17833, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Caselli, Francesco & Cunningham, Tom & Morelli, Massimo & Moreno de Barreda, Inés, 2012. "Signalling, Incumbency Advantage, and Optimal Reelection Thresholds," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 8832, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Francesco Caselli & Tom Cunningham & Massimo Morelli & Inés Moreno de Barreda, 2012. "Signalling, Incumbency Advantage, and Optimal Reelection Rules," CEP Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE dp1122, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
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