Free riders and strong reciprocators coexist in public goods experiments: evolutionary foundations
AbstractExperimental evidence indicates that free riders and strongly reciprocal papers coexist in the public goods game framework. By means of an evolutionary analysis, we provide an endogenization of this behavioral regularity.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by AccessEcon in its journal Economics Bulletin.
Volume (Year): 30 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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Free Riding; Cooperation; Strong Reciprocity; Public Goods Game; Evolutionary Game Theory.;
Other versions of this item:
- Angelo Antoci & Paolo Russu & Luca Zarri, 2009. "Free riders and strong reciprocators coexist in public goods experiments: evolutionary foundations," Working Papers 55/2009, University of Verona, Department of Economics.
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- Z1 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics
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