Boycotting a dictatorship: who does it really hurt?
AbstractConsumer boycotts and international economic sanctions represent a frequent tool to protest against countries for their violation of human rights. This paper questions if such a kind of action hurts more the populations it is supposed to defend than governing classes it is targeting. Overall, boycotts of more rapacious regimes may decrease more the well-being of the population than the one of the governing class.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by AccessEcon in its journal Economics Bulletin.
Volume (Year): 29 (2009)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Contact details of provider:
consumer boycott; dictatorial regimes.;
Other versions of this item:
- Philippe Delacote, 2009. "Boycotting a dictatorship: who does it really hurt?," Working Papers 29783, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, France.
- D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
- F5 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy
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