On the design of an optimal transfer schedule with time inconsistent preferences
AbstractThis paper incorporates the phenomenon of time inconsistency into the problem of designing an optimal transfer schedule under income shocks and asymmetric information. The optimal solution reflects the dilemma that a principal has to face when playing the roles of self-control enforcer and consumption smoother simultaneously.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by AccessEcon in its journal Economics Bulletin.
Volume (Year): 8 (2008)
Issue (Month): 5 ()
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- Campo, Juan Carlos Chavez-Martin del, 2006. "On the Design of an Optimal Transfer Schedule with Time Inconsistent Preferences," Working Papers 127040, Cornell University, Department of Applied Economics and Management.
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