Financial Intermediation and Entry-Deterrence: A survey
AbstractIn this paper, we summarize the findings of a series of our papers on the relationship between financial contracting and the game of entry-deterrence in a dynamic context.The incumbent has private information about its cost and enters into an agency relationship with a lender in each of the two periods. We examine the effect of this agency relationship on the probability of entry and limit pricing on the one hand and the effect of the game of entry-deterrence on the form of the financial contract on the other. The three papers make different assumptions about the uncertainty of demand and the informational structure.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by AccessEcon in its journal Economics Bulletin.
Volume (Year): 12 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
- L0 - Industrial Organization - - General
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- Dan Kovenock & Gordon M Phillips, 1995.
"Capital Structure And Product Market Rivalry: How Do We Reconcile Theory And Evidence?,"
95-3, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau.
- Kovenock, Dan & Phillips, Gordon, 1995. "Capital Structure and Product-Market Rivalry: How Do We Reconcile Theory and Evidence?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 403-08, May.
- Neelam Jain & Thomas D. Jeitschko & Leonard J. Mirman, 2001.
"Financial Intermediation and Entry Deterrence,"
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
01-037/2, Tinbergen Institute.
- Phillips, Gordon M., 1995. "Increased debt and industry product markets An empirical analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 189-238, February.
- Poitevin, M., 1987.
"Strategic Financial Signalling,"
Cahiers de recherche
8755, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Bolton, Patrick & Scharfstein, David S, 1990. "A Theory of Predation Based on Agency Problems in Financial Contracting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 93-106, March.
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