This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

On stability of Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in a simple model of the labour market

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Massimo A. De Francesco () (Department of Economics, University of Siena)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We examine a Bertrand-Edgeworth model of competition in a labour market where the workers simultaneously set wages disregarding any influence their current decision may have on opponents' future decisions. The iterated best response process is shown to converge in finite time to a Bertrand-Nash solution, where wages are set at the market-clearing level. This convergence result is also shown to hold when the assumption of static expectations is replaced by milder restrictions on beliefs about opponents' wages.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.economicsbulletin.com/2001/volume3/EB-01C70015A.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Article provided by Economics Bulletin in its journal Economics Bulletin.

Volume (Year): 3 (2001)
Issue (Month): ()
Pages: 1-10
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-01c70015

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Economics Bulletin, Department of Economics, 414 Calhoun Hall, Vanderbilt University, Nashville TN 37235, USA
Phone: 615-322-2920
Fax: 615-343-8495
Email:
Web page: http://www.economicsbulletin.com

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (John Conley).

Related research
Keywords: Labour market; Bertrand-Nash equilibrium; iterated best responses; adjustment processes;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
J3 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Vives, Xavier, 1986. "Rationing rules and Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibria in large markets," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 113-116. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Cheng-Zhong Qin & Charles Stuart, 1997. "Bertrand versus Cournot revisited," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 497-507. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Cheng-Zhong Qin & Burkhard Hehenkamp & Charles Stuart, 1999. "Economic natural selection in Bertrand and Cournot settings," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 211-224. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? All RePEc services are meant to be be free forever, as they are all run by volunteers.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-12.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.