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On the existence of self-enforcing equilibria

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Author Info
Antonio Quesada () (Universidad de Murcia, Spain)

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Abstract

It is argued that if an out-of-equilibrium player observing a deviation from a presumed strategically stable path of play believes that a player also observing the deviation is more likely to deviate than a player who does not observe the deviation then it is possible to justify, in some extensive form game, the non-existence of a self-enforcing equilibrium.

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File URL: http://www.economicsbulletin.com/2001/volume3/EB-01C70006A.pdf
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Economics Bulletin in its journal Economics Bulletin.

Volume (Year): 3 (2001)
Issue (Month): ()
Pages: 1-5
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-01c70006

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Postal: Economics Bulletin, Department of Economics, 414 Calhoun Hall, Vanderbilt University, Nashville TN 37235, USA
Phone: 615-322-2920
Fax: 615-343-8495
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Web page: http://www.economicsbulletin.com

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Related research
Keywords: Extensive form game strategic stability of equilibria sequential rationality.

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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This page was last updated on 2008-9-25.

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