This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Enforcing Tax Compliance: To Punish or Persuade?

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Murphy, Kristina () (Faculty of Arts and Education, Deakin University, Melbourne (Australia))
Abstract

A long standing debate has existed between those who believe deterrence-based enforcement strategies work for gaining compliance from offenders and those who believe gentle persuasion and cooperation is more effective. This article is concerned with the issue of how to best deal with offenders so as to increase support for the law and lower the rate of subsequent re-offending. Using survey data from 652 taxpayers who have been through an enforcement experience with the Australian Taxation Office, the present study will show that depending on how an enforcement experience is perceived by offenders (as either stigmatic or reintegrative in nature) can influence the feelings of resentment they experience, but more importantly these feelings of resentment mediate the effect of punishment on subsequent compliance behaviour. In other words, it is these feelings of resentment in response to disapproval that go on to predict who will and will not comply with their subsequent obligations under the law.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://eap-journal.com/download.php?file=663
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Article provided by Queensland University of Technology (QUT), School of Economics and Finance in its journal Economic Analysis and Policy (EAP).

Volume (Year): 38 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 113-135
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:eap:articl:v:38:y:2008:i:1:p:113-135

Contact details of provider:
Postal: GPO Box 2434, BRISBANE QLD 4001
Email:
Web page: http://www.eap-journal.com/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Manuela Torgler).

Related research
Keywords: tax compliance; punishment; emotions; reintegrative shaming theory; K Law and Economics;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
K - Law and Economics

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Alm, James & Sanchez, Isabel & de Juan, Ana, 1995. "Economic and Noneconomic Factors in Tax Compliance," Kyklos, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 48(1), pages 3-18.
  2. Kristina Murphy, 2007. "Procedural Justice and the Regulation of Tax Compliance Behaviour: The Moderating Role of Personal Norms," International Studies Program Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper0731, International Studies Program, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University. [Downloadable!]
  3. Alm, James & Jackson, Betty R. & McKee, Michael, 1993. "Fiscal exchange, collective decision institutions, and tax compliance," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 285-303, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Frey, Bruno S, 1997. "A Constitution for Knaves Crowds Out Civic Virtues," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(443), pages 1043-53, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. James Andreoni & Brian Erard & Jonathan Feinstein, 1998. "Tax Compliance," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(2), pages 818-860, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, 2002. "Trust breeds trust: How taxpayers are treated," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 87-99, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Alm, James & McClelland, Gary H. & Schulze, William D., 1992. "Why do people pay taxes?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 21-38, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Marsha Blumenthal & Charles Christian & Joel Slemrod, 1998. "The Determinants of Income Tax Compliance: Evidence from a Controlled Experiment in Minnesota," NBER Working Papers 6575, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Ernst Fehr & Bettina Rockenbach, 2003. "Detrimental effects of sanctions on human altruism," Microeconomics 0305007, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS also indexes book chapters.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-18.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.