Enforcing Tax Compliance: To Punish or Persuade?
AbstractA long standing debate has existed between those who believe deterrence-based enforcement strategies work for gaining compliance from offenders and those who believe gentle persuasion and cooperation is more effective. This article is concerned with the issue of how to best deal with offenders so as to increase support for the law and lower the rate of subsequent re-offending. Using survey data from 652 taxpayers who have been through an enforcement experience with the Australian Taxation Office, the present study will show that depending on how an enforcement experience is perceived by offenders (as either stigmatic or reintegrative in nature) can influence the feelings of resentment they experience, but more importantly these feelings of resentment mediate the effect of punishment on subsequent compliance behaviour. In other words, it is these feelings of resentment in response to disapproval that go on to predict who will and will not comply with their subsequent obligations under the law.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Queensland University of Technology (QUT), School of Economics and Finance in its journal Economic Analysis and Policy (EAP).
Volume (Year): 38 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
tax compliance; punishment; emotions; reintegrative shaming theory; K Law and Economics;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K - Law and Economics
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ernst Fehr & Bettina Rockenbach, 2003. "Detrimental effects of sanctions on human altruism," Microeconomics 0305007, EconWPA.
- Kristina Murphy, 2007. "Procedural Justice and the Regulation of Tax Compliance Behaviour: The Moderating Role of Personal Norms," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper0731, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
- Marsha Blumenthal & Charles Christian & Joel Slemrod, 1998. "The Determinants of Income Tax Compliance: Evidence from a Controlled Experiment in Minnesota," NBER Working Papers 6575, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November.
- Alm, James & Jackson, Betty R. & McKee, Michael, 1993. "Fiscal exchange, collective decision institutions, and tax compliance," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 285-303, December.
- Frey, Bruno S, 1997. "A Constitution for Knaves Crowds Out Civic Virtues," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(443), pages 1043-53, July.
- Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, 2000.
"Trust Breeds Trust: How Taxpayers are Treated,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
322, CESifo Group Munich.
- James Andreoni & Brian Erard & Jonathan Feinstein, 1998.
Journal of Economic Literature,
American Economic Association, vol. 36(2), pages 818-860, June.
- Alm, James & McClelland, Gary H. & Schulze, William D., 1992. "Why do people pay taxes?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 21-38, June.
- Alm, James & Sanchez, Isabel & de Juan, Ana, 1995. "Economic and Noneconomic Factors in Tax Compliance," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(1), pages 3-18.
- Dubin, Jeffrey A. & Wilde, Louis L., 1988. "An Empirical Analysis of Federal Income Tax Auditing and Compliance," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 41(1), pages 61-74, March Cit.
- Marcelo Arbex & Enlinson Mattos, 2013. "Optimal Sales Tax Rebates and Tax Enforcement Consumers," Working Papers 1302, University of Windsor, Department of Economics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Manuela Torgler).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.