The Welfare Cost of Capital Controls
AbstractThis paper examines the macroeconomic implications of capital controls that limit international financial flows to emerging economies. Using extended loanable funds analysis, it first demonstrates how perfect capital mobility contributes to development, contrary to a prevalent view that international borrowing inimical to the economic welfare of developing economies. As a corollary, the analysis then shows that capital controls, irrespective of form, generally reduce development potential and economic welfare by widening real cross-border interest differentials. Capital controls in the form of quantitative controls, such as the Chilean unremunerated reserve requirement system, and explicit taxes on foreign investment flows impose similar welfare losses. However, quantitative controls are relatively more costly than options to tax capital flows, due to revenue effects.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Queensland University of Technology (QUT), School of Economics and Finance in its journal Economic Analysis and Policy (EAP).
Volume (Year): 36 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (March/September)
Capital Control; Financial Flow;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F21 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Investment; Long-Term Capital Movements
- F32 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Current Account Adjustment; Short-term Capital Movements
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